ANIMAL RIGHTS - MORAL, THEORY AND PRACTICE

The rich man had exceeding many flocks and herds. But the poor man had nothing save one little ewe lamb, which he had bought and nourished up: and it grew up together with him, and with his children; it did eat of his own meat, and drink of his own cup, and lay in his bosom, and was unto him as a daughter. And there came a traveller unto the rich man, and he spared to take of his own flock and of his own herd to dress for the wayfaring man that was come unto him; but took the poor man’s lamb, and dressed it for the man that was come unto him.’ And David’s anger was greatly kindled against the man; and he said to Nathan ... ‘the man that hath done this thing shall surely die ... because he had no pity.’ And Nathan said to David,‘Thou art the man.’ (Samuel 12: 2–7)

Justice requires, then, that we should treat those individuals who possess inherent value – that is, who are subjects-of-a-life – in accordance with the respect principle and the harm principle. This provides the basis for Regan’s claim that individuals with inherent value also possess moral rights. Regan’s demonstration of this latter claim proceeds by way of an analysis of the concept of a right. Regan adopts the widely accepted view of moral rights as valid claims.The relevant sort of valid claims have two aspects, (i) a valid claim-to, and (ii) a valid claim-against.
A claim-to, in this context, is a claim to a certain commodity, freedom, or type of treatment by others. And to be a valid claim-to, the claim must be backed, or validated, by an appeal to a correct moral principle or principles. Thus, the claimant can demonstrate that she is owed the commodity, freedom, or treatment in question by appeal to the relevant moral principles.
In order to be a valid claim-against, a claim must be made against assignable individuals who do in fact owe what the claimant asserts. And, again, whether the individuals in question do owe the commodity or treatment must again be decided by appeal to correct moral principles.
When both a claim-to and a claim-against has been validated by appeal to correct moral principles, we can speak of a valid claim all things considered. And this, according to the present analysis, is what constitutes a moral right. To have a moral right to a certain commodity or treatment is to have a valid claim all things considered to that commodity or treatment, and a valid claim all things considered against whatever individuals are to provide the commodity or treatment.
Regan has, of course, already argued that the respect principle and the harm principle are valid moral principles. Therefore, a claim, made against assignable individuals, to a certain commodity or treatment will be a valid claim all things considered if it is backed or validated by an appeal to either the respect or the harm principle. Therefore, any individual with inherent value has a moral right to treatment that respects this value. The right to such treatment is a valid claim-against assignable individuals (i.e., all moral agents) and a valid claim-to a certain type of treatment, the validity of each claim being backed by the respect principle, a valid moral principle. Similarly, any individual with inherent value has a prima facie right not to be harmed.
Such a right is again a valid claim-to and a valid claim-against, the validity of each being backed by the harm principle, a correct moral principle. Therefore, any individual who has inherent value (i.e., a subject-of-a-life) has a moral right to treatment that respects this value and a prima facie moral right not to be harmed.
Two points should be noted. Firstly, the right not to be harmed is a prima facie moral right only. That is, it can be overridden in certain circumstances (to be clarifi ed shortly). The prima facie status of the right, here, is due to the prima facie status of the harm principle from which it derives.
Secondly, according to Regan, one consequence of this analysis is that one can have moral rights only against moral agents; not against moral patients or inanimate objects. The reason for this stems from the nature of claims-against. A claim-against can be a valid one only if the individual against whom the claim is made is capable of meeting the requirements of the claim. That is, the individual must be capable of providing the treatment or commodity that, according to the claim, is due. Thus, for example, we can have no moral rights against nature.

We would have such rights only if nature was capable of providing us with the commodity or treatment we claimed was due. But nature is obviously incapable of acting in such a way. More precisely, we could have valid claims against nature only if nature has direct duties to us to do or forbear doing certain acts that are our due. But nature, in this sense, is capable neither of doing nor forbearing from doing things. To say that nature ought to do certain things, or forbear from doing certain things, is to presuppose that nature can choose in the relevant sort of way. But nature obviously cannot choose what it does. Therefore, we have no rights against nature because we have no valid claims against nature.
This also allows us to dispense very neatly with a frequently raised objection to the concept of animal rights: the claim that the concept leads to absurdity. The argument runs as follows. If sheep have rights, then these are violated by wolves that prey on them. Therefore, it seems that if we have a duty of assistance to sheep to stop those who violate their rights, then it seems we have a duty to stop wolves from preying on sheep. However, if we were to do this, we would be violating the wolves’ rights by harming them (e.g., by consigning them to a slow painful death through starvation).
Thus, either way we end up violating some creature’s rights. And, therefore, the whole concept of animal rights leads to logical absurdity. Once, however, we understand that moral rights are valid claims, this objection can be stopped, so to speak, before it even starts. The sheep has no moral rights with respect to wolves. That is, the sheep does not have a valid claim-against the wolf to refrain from eating it. This is because the wolf is not a moral agent, hence is not capable of choosing, in any morally relevant sense, whether or not to eat the sheep.
The sheep would have a valid claim-against the wolf in this regard only if the wolf had the capacity to forbear from eating the sheep. And the wolf has no such capacity. That is, to say that the sheep has a right against the wolf not to eat it is to imply that the wolf ought not to eat the sheep. And to say that the wolf ought not to eat the sheep is to imply that the wolf is capable of choosing whether or not to eat the sheep. But the wolf has no such capacity. Therefore, the sheep has no valid claim-against the wolf not to eat it. And, therefore, the sheep has no moral right against the wolf in this regard. Neither, for that matter, do humans (not that wolves ever eat humans). It makes no sense to speak simply of a moral right to X as such. To speak of a moral right is always an elliptical way of referring to the individual against whom the right is claimed; it presupposes such an individual or individuals. And we can only have rights against moral agents.

By Mark Rowlands (University of Miami, Florida, USA) in the book 'Animal Rights- Moral Theory and Practice'. Palgrave MacMillan UK, 2009, p.68-71. Adapted and illustrated to be posted by Leopoldo Costa.

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